Information Sharing And Cooperation/Coordination Of The LawEnforcement With Its Counterparts In Intelligence Community
Information Sharing And Cooperation/Coordination Of The LawEnforcement With Its Counterparts In Intelligence Community
Thereis no other place than the national security, diplomacy,intelligence, defense, and law enforcement agencies that gettingcorrect information on time is critical. Similarly, the government isaware the subsequent consequences in situations where there areinadequate information. Therefore, experts are publishing reportsconcerning national security and information sharing rapidly. Thereforms in the information sharing among the law enforcement bodies,security, and intelligence community have been useful and seem toyield positive results.
PresidentBarrack Obama instructed key officials to revise the unclassifiedinformation framework under their control, which President George W.Bush established in May of 2008 for classifying sensitive,unclassified data related to terrorism as a section of the federalinformation-sharing environment. Obama commissioned the seniorofficials to devise ways of tracking agencies’ efforts in adoptingthe Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) framework and assesswhether the scope of its framework should be broad beyond informationrelated to terrorism and include all the Sensitive But Unclassified(SBU) data.
Ifthere is a lack of a single and full implemented comprehensiveframework, the continuity of multiple SBU categories, coupled withperceived and institutional technological obstacles for approachingthe culture of information-sharing, goes on to hamper thecollaboration. President Obama observed that the authorized SBU datasharing between agencies, and state and federal government, privatesector, tribal governments, and the local, would enhance nationalsecurity.
Theexchange of information enhances security as the government hasensured that the sharing of such information among its agencies is atop priority. However, as much as the government advocates for theexchange of information among the agencies, various individual,organizational, and cultural barriers impede the sharing of suchinformation in most cases. Nevertheless, the official as per thepresident’s observation should devise means to create an atmospherefor the desire to share and the responsibility to provide not thedesire to know. The rationale is that if an individual ororganization were driven by the zeal to provide or share, ratherknow, there would be a better coordination among the security andintelligence agencies. Consequently, the national security would notbe under threat most of the times. However, the poor securityintelligence is due to the lack of coordination and suspicion amongthe agencies.
Notwithstandinga considerable amount of local, state, and federal policy attention,comparatively the experts hardly direct research attention towardsconsidering the role of the police in the fight and preventionagainst terrorism. Despite referring to police agencies as “TheEyes and Ears” on the prevention of terrorism,1only a handful of authors offer specific recommendations and detailsconcerning the available programs and implementations for thesheriffs and police units. For example, when addressing therelationship between the police role and homeland security, theauthors refer to the role the police play as intelligence gathering.White goes to explain that currently, the police are not forcollecting intelligence by asserting that the use of police indefense undertakings would imply redefining the role of police in alegal sense, but it is possible.2However, such redefinition of the police duty would call for asignificant shift in the daily procedures and police objectives.Therefore, instead of recruiting intelligence officers to gather andprocess information, the agencies could cooperate by trusting andinviting the police to gather feasible terrorism activity signs, andthen forward the information to intelligence processors. However,some firms may be willing to collaborate with others but certainbarriers hinder them from collaborating.
TheBarriers to Information Sharing between Government Agencies.
Accordingto the available literature, the general impediments to the exchangeof information by government security agencies are in variouscategories:
• Legaland procedural obstacles, and
• Political,managerial, and organizational impediments, which discourage sharinginformation between agencies.
Thegovernment has always equipped public companies with sufficientautonomy to operate and furnished the organizations with immenseinternal and external regulations to ensure they do abuse suchpowers. For example, the government accords general managers withbroad discretion and significant resources for them to administerprograms, but they susceptible to an array norms, procedures, andlaws that would carefully monitor and regulate their behavior. Thepart suspicions play in an inconsistent environment that the Americancitizens expect the government to work for them, but it should not doa thing to them. Such situation compels bureaucrats to be cautiouswhile practicing their skills and remain within their operationallimits. Therefore, agencies cannot work beyond their limits as theauthorizing statute establishing them provides. For instance, anagency cannot gather information outside their jurisdiction ormandate. Consequently, the issue is the circumstance under which onecompany may share the information it has collected with itscounterparts. Nevertheless, those companies that are not willing toshare their information would opt for explicit statutory authorityfor sharing information. In other words, the companies that are superactive would regard small statutory guideline as a hindrance to theirdiscretion. Consequently, there is uncertainty in any statute that isopen to inaction by bureaucrats and abuses by overzealousadministrators.3
Incompatiblesoftware and wireless or wire line and hardware communicationinfrastructure may lead to critical interoperability issue. However,technicians can quickly solve the problems after ascertaining theactual cost. However, even though they may overcome the problems, themetadata will still be an issue. Because of conflicting data, sharinginformation is often a problem due to contradictory data definitions.Therefore, the solution is establishing uniform standards, but theymay build certain procedures on data definitions, and the change instandard may need alterations to the current systems.
Allagencies have their powerbases the level of the shape is congruenton the ability of policy-making levels in a given organization.According to White, the contemporary executive sections are a fourthgovernment branch with the ability to influence and shape policiesautonomously without permission from the Judiciary, Legislature, andthe chief Executive.4Sharing of crucial information with other agencies would make themsusceptible to power loss in matters of making and implementingpolicies. However, it is obvious that if an agency collects suchinformation over the years through a painful process, it regards suchinformation as its property, but not other people or institutions’property. Therefore, Turf is a significant impediment to overcome andinvolves various reasons for organizations to behave in a defensivemanner: control or reduce risk, to avoid change costs, preserve theautonomy, and to guard their position in adverse and competitiveenvironments.
Sincethe sharing of information requires a higher authority forcoordination and ensure they share decision-making, it could lead tothe collapse of one agency’s resources and operations. Moreover,the loss of an agency’s autonomy would benefit institutional orpolitical adversaries, as such the company would aggressively resistthe initiative to share information. Citizens should feel completecontrol and trust for putting in place adequate systems forinformation exchange before it becomes operationally and politicallypossible for them to have interoperable systems of information.Similarly, citizens wish to trust the government for risking theirprivacy for the safety of the public.
Thereis a similarity between organizations and individuals in the sensethat they weigh the benefits and risks before they make a decision.Since organizational cooperation benefits are often difficult andindirect to ascertain, agencies engage in cooperative as long as thebenefit outweigh risks and if there is a possibility, they willsucceed. However, an organization cannot share its intelligencewithout any expectation that it would achieve some internal benefits,broaden its influence over its counterparts, and refine its publicimage. Therefore, it is crucial that before groups share theirinformation, they should establish a mutual trust. Nevertheless,faith does not need a standard belief, rather an expectation andobligation. The expectation has three dimensions: (1) dependability,where they have the crucial resources for acting. (2) participantmotives, they should not betray or exploit each other. (3)Collegiality, they should show fairness and respect, and (4)competency, the possession of the skills and knowledge to executetheir common interest.5Therefore, mutual expectation and obligation are keys: governancestructures based on mutual trust have productive, institutionalconsultative structures whose existence depends on the assumptionthat agents expect the confluence of belief to harmonize theiractions. Nonetheless, various forces that develop in smallorganization networks: discussing and sharing information similarityin techniques and processing the long-term relationship, experiencein collaborating with other organizations, similar size, strategicposition between organizations, leadership rotation, and economicbenefits that support the shared meaning. It is critical to haveprior experience in collaborating with others because the absence ofexperience in inter-organizational interaction or collaboration mayimpede future relationships.
Theintra-organizational issues concerning the management of informationcould be another reason for little information sharing levels forsome agencies. Good information management calls for the agency’sinformation inventory. Similarly, an agency’s financial constraintsmay hinder the system’s information sharing.
Typically,the term ‘networks’ refers to the arrangements of manyorganizations to solve the issues that are not easy to achieve by oneorganization. The application of conventional management point ofview, which they develop for the purposes of intra-organizationalsettings, into inter-organizational structures yields satisfactoryresults. According to White (2002), those interactions andrelationships, which result realizing the networkobjective-synthesis, are the purpose of the network manager.Therefore, significant managerial behaviors encompass furthering andfacilitating further interaction among the people taking part.Similarly, it also involves reducing uncertainty and complexitythrough promotion of information sharing, changing positions, rolesand relations of members, development of new procedures andinteraction rules, providing assistance to make the system becomeself-organizing, and prompting reasonable communication between theparticipants (29, pg. 4).
Onesuch necessary ingredient in the flow of information in theinter-organizational network for groupware development is socialcapital. As per Taylor (1997), social capital is a stock that emergesas a group develops the capacity to operate together for a collectivebenefit. Just like human capital and physical capital, training andtools that enable individual productivity, it refers to theattributes of social organization, such as norms, trust, andnetworks, which facilitate cooperation and coordination for mutualbenefit.
Law Enforcement Agencies Information Sharing Internationally
Onthe 11th, September 2001, the United States was attacked and fromthat time information sharing has been a topic of discussion in thevarious sectors among them including bureaucrats, law enforcementofficer, politicians and academicians. Majority of the people are in agreement that must organizations to network their information withothers.Chu asserted that properly implemented information sharingwould be oh help to most instances both emergency and those not,reduce administration and operation costs, the criminals beingcaptured and convicted would rise in a number.
Thereis continued discussion about the pros and cons of a centralized lawenforcement system, after the disaster, it is now clear that mustcommunication among the agencies involved in law enforcement at thelocal and international levels. The United States is leading in thosewith fragmented and decentralized systems of law enforcement. It isevidenced by the Table 1 that shows the different governmentorganizations the country has. The law enforcement system hereentails agencies at the federal, state, local levels. A concernarises on a centralized system that would result to authoritarianrule and those against it has a view that having a centralized technology and information sharing system would infringe theAmerican constitution on the doctrine of separation of power and alsothe federalism. Those who are in support for a decentralized system argues that it are beneficial as it strengthens thedecision-making. They argue that it functions by the various branchessince it will be of common good and also ensuring that state’spower and rights are informed on the various happenings across thevarious branches, which are part of the matter.6
TheNational Commission on Terrorist Attack recommended on their reporton the attack. The recommendation is on the improvement of theexchange of information among the various organizations of thegovernment at all levels. The typical classes that fall on thesharing are raw materials that have undergone through someassessment or none that are regarding its reliability. Theintelligence evaluated on the significance and the credibility of thesource.DHS and the suggestions made created the FBI Dallas EmergencyResponse Network (FBI ERN).FBI ERN has recorded achievements in boththe daily and crisis use mode. The network has a role to inintelligence sharing and dissemination for a short time among theagencies. Robert F. Decay, who is the Director of Information Security Issues oh HS has put emphasis on the exchange of information during the testimony to the House of Representatives.There is the view that success of the security system depends onthe effective processes and systems in facilitating the informationsharing among the sectors namely the private and government entitiesas well.
Thereis the creation of an intranet by the name POL-NET by the TurkishNational Police (TNP).the POL-NET establishment is dated to 1996 bythe Department of Information Technology. That department brings upinformation systems projects by use of the working of the fieldofficers to make the software development appropriate for thatfield.
Theprograms and the system are then made available to the TNP. One ofthe largest closed computer network for TNP is established by theDepartment of Information Technology, this network is anorganizational intranet with about 15000 computers and has morethan 30000 users in all the TNP jurisdiction areas. Thesejurisdiction areas include city police, the TNP Headquarters,airports, border gates, and other places with TNP infrastructure inthe country. This network is among the largest Microsoft-basednetworks currently in the world. The POL-NET is composed of 25different projects, they include vehicle registration, trafficcontrol, drivers license, border gate control among others. Thissystemhelped the TNP by enabling faster accesses to information and enabling the exchange of information more appropriately.However, it does not demonstrate that the system is limited in the fight of terrorism in fact it supports many of the projectsdesigned to combat terrorism. POL-NET is utilized by the TNP forthe purpose of sharing information in a very satisfactory way atthe local level(national).7
InternationalInformation and Technology Sharing
IntegratedBorder Enforcement Team (IBET’s)
Itis a bi-national program, unlike the multi-national program. Themodel is the best example of the programs used for technological and information sharing among the various agencies involved in lawenforcement. The Integrated Border Enforcement Team program, thedefinition is a multi-faceted law enforcement initiative composedof both the American and the Canadian partners. This bi-national partnership allows the core five-law enforcement partners that areinvolved in IBETS to collaborate in work and sharing ofinformation with other local and state agencies. They partner in dealing with matters on national security and other kind of crimesthat are transacted on the United States` border and Canada andalso the ports connecting the countries. Because he personnel,technology comes from many different companies the program is called‘force multiplier.
Bysharing of information and technology by the two countries, theyhave been able to create a fully operational, multi-disciplinedintelligence system that has strengthen the security around theborder by creation of borders integrity and security that fight the trans-border crimes due to the information sharing mechanisms.
InternationalPolice Organization( Interpol)
Itis the largest of all the international police organization with 186 constituent country being members. It was established in 1923 it hasa role in the facilitation of the cross-border police co-operation,supporting and providing assistance to all organizations, also hasauthority and service that has a mission to reduce and come over the international crimes committed.
Baker, Juan. 2002. "Intelligence and LawEnforcement Coordination: Overlapping Mission Dictates Need forImproved Liaison." MilitaryIntelligence Professional Bulletin 28, no.3: 22.
Cumming, Alfred, and Todd Masse. 2004. "FBIIntelligence Reform Since September 11, 2001: Issues and Options forCongress: RL32336." CongressionalResearch Service: Report 1.
Martin, Kate. 2002. "Intelligence, Terrorism,and Civil Liberties." Human Rights29, no. 1: 5. Academic Search Premier
Mihm, J. Christoper. 2004. "Intelligence Reform:Human Capital Considerations Critical to 9/11 Commission`s ProposedReforms: GAO-04-1084T." GAO Reports1
Pelfrey, William. 2005. "Parallels betweenCommunity Oriented Policing and the War on Terrorism: LessonsLearned." Criminal Justice Studies18, no. 4: 335-346.
White,J. R. (2002). Defending the homeland: Domestic intelligence, lawenforcement, and security. Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth.
1White, J. R. (2002). Defending the homeland: Domestic intelligence, law enforcement, and security. Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth.
2(2002, p. 37).
3 Mihm, J. Christoper. 2004. "Intelligence Reform: Human Capital Considerations Critical to 9/11 Commission`s Proposed Reforms: GAO-04-1084T." GAO Reports 1
4White, J. R. (2002). Defending the homeland: Domestic intelligence, law enforcement, and security. Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth.
5 Martin, Kate. 2002. "Intelligence, Terrorism, and Civil Liberties." Human Rights 29, no. 1: 5. Academic Search Premier
6 Baker, Juan. 2002. "Intelligence and Law Enforcement Coordination: Overlapping Mission Dictates Need for Improved Liaison." Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin 28, no. 3: 22.
7Pelfrey, William. 2005. "Parallels between Community Oriented Policing and the War on Terrorism: Lessons Learned." Criminal Justice Studies 18, no. 4: 335-346.